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The pension debate in France has essentially focused, until recently, on
ways of ﬁnancing retirement, with a strong opposition between supporters
of maintaining the quasi-exclusivity for pay-as-you-go (PAYG) ﬁnancing
and supporters of a progressive introduction of funded pensions, on top of
existing PAYG basic and complementary schemes.
Attention has, however, recently shifted toward another variable of ad-
justment to the new demographic context, which is the age at retirement or,
more widely, the age at exit from the labor force. The mean age at retire-
ment in France is in the lower tail of the European distribution, and has
been diminishing for the past twenty years for two main reasons:
• The incentive structure of the pension system itself, especially since
the introduction of the retraite à 60 ans: until 1982, the ﬁrst age of eli-
gibility to social security (SS) beneﬁts was 65. It was shifted to 60 for
all wage earners in 1983. Retirement before reaching a total tenure of
37.5 years remained strongly penalized in the régime général, which
covers about 65 percent of wage earners, but this constraint did not ap-
ply to most older male workers (since they often began to work about
age 15) and thus did not prevent a continuous decline in participation
rates.
• The relative generosity of unemployment beneﬁts or early retirement
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of Labor.erosity of these schemes was expanded to allow people between 60 and
65 to retire. When the early retirement age was set at 60, unemploy-
ment or early retirement provisions were targeted on people aged 55
to 59, whose participation rates also sharply decreased.
Age at retirement appears to be one variable on which there is potential
room for large adjustments. Some steps have been made into this direction
by one reform of the régime général, in 1993, which planned a progressive
strengthening of the conditions giving access to normal (full-rate) retire-
ment at age 60: the pre-1993 condition was to totalize at least 150 quarters
(or 37.5 years) of contribution to pension schemes. This threshold will pro-
gressively increase to reach 160 quarters (i.e., forty years) from 2003. One
of the propositions discussed in the Charpin Report (1999), ordered by the
current prime minister, is to go further along this same direction, raising
this threshold to 170 quarters.
Of course, modifying this state of aﬀairs raises many problems. The low
age at retirement or early retirement is itself a response to an employment
shortage, and it is often feared that a less permissive policy may result in a
worsened situation in the labor market; conversely, policies of early with-
drawal from the labor force were never proved to be of any help in mitigat-
ing employment problems. The question can also be raised as to what is the
best way to induce people to leave the labor force later. One possibility is
coercion. The other is to rely (preferably) on incentives, with the idea of
compensating the desired increase of the average retirement age by the in-
troduction of more ﬂexibility in this retirement age. This is the option
speciﬁcally proposed by the Charpin Report, which suggests compensat-
ing the strengthening of conditions necessary to get a normal pension by a
reduction of penalties associated with either the anticipation or postpon-
ing of retirement. The French system is characterized by a strong deviation
from marginal actuarial fairness, and the proposition is made to bring it
closer to this rule.
This context calls for a closer inspection of what determines retirement
behavior, from both demand and supply sides, and also for an assessment
of the ﬁnancial implications of modiﬁcations of the retirement incentives.
In this respect, the reforms studied in this chapter are not being proposed
as feasible reforms for France. They are only chosen in order to illustrate
the impact of behavioral eﬀects and, of course, in order to proceed to cross-
country comparisons. The following analysis will essentially focus on
supply-side eﬀects, although we shall try, systematically, to remind the
reader of the importance of the demand side.
This chapter closely follows Mahieu and Blanchet (2002), which pro-
vided estimates of the eﬀect of retirement incentives on labor participa-
tion. We performed new estimations of similar probit models of the retire-
ment decision, which now include survivor beneﬁts, which was not the case
before. We then used these estimates to simulate the eﬀect of possible re-
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tions to retirement income ﬁnances. These simulations include the impact
of reforms on early retirement and unemployment provisions.
4.2 Basic Facts about the French Pension System
4.2.1 The Diﬀerent Schemes
The French system is complex, but its structure can nevertheless be
summed up quite simply.
• For a large part of the population (wage earners in the private sector),
pensions rely on two pillars:
1. The basic general scheme (Social Security), which oﬀers beneﬁts
corresponding to the share of gross wages below a Social Security ceil-
ing (€2,352 per month in 2002). In 1992, 70.5 percent of people over
60 received a pension from this general scheme. On the contributors’
side, in the same year, the general scheme gathered 64.8 percent of the
labor force.
2. Complementary schemes, organized on an occupational basis.
They consist of a large number (about 180) of speciﬁc schemes that are
federated in two main organisms, ensuring interscheme demographic
compensation: the executives’ pension scheme general association
(AGIRC) for executive workers and only for the fraction of their wages
over the Social Security ceiling, and the wage earners’ mandatory
complementary pension schemes association (ARRCO) for other
workers and executives’ wages below the ceiling. In 1972, contributing
to a complementary scheme became compulsory. Today, complemen-
tary schemes provide 40 percent of retirement pensions for wage earn-
ers in the private sector.
• Besides this simple two-pillar structure, the complexity of the French
system, in fact, is essentially due to the existence of a large number of
exceptions to this general rule of organization. These exceptions are
the result of two factors. When Social Security was created, in 1945,
people who already beneﬁted from more generous dispositions re-
fused to join the new system (for instance, civil servants or people em-
ployed in state-owned companies). Conversely, some categories chose
to adopt cheaper systems oﬀering lower protection because they
thought that a large part of their retirement needs was likely to be
covered by other sources, such as professional capital for the self-
employed. Besides the two-pillar system constituted by the general
scheme and ARRCO/AGIRC, there are therefore a multiplicity of spe-
ciﬁc schemes (civil servants, the self-employed) applying speciﬁc rules.
For instance, there are about 120 ﬁrst-pillar retirement schemes other
than the general scheme. In particular, it must be observed that civil
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since their pensions are directly paid by the state budget.
For all categories of people, there is a system of old-age minimum al-
lowance (minimum vieillesse), which is a means-tested allowance available
for people aged 65 or more. The population beneﬁting from this minimum
pension has regularly declined in the past, due to the increasing maturity
of normal pensions. It is now slightly below 1 million, against 2.55 million
in 1959 (Commissariat Général du Plan 1995).
The following analysis will deal with two subpopulations: wage earners
from the private sector and civil servants. We now give more details about
the computation of pensions for these two categories.
4.2.2 Wage Earners in the Private Sector
General Regime
The basic general scheme oﬀers contributory beneﬁts corresponding to
the share of wages below the Social Security ceiling. The principle is that
the pension is proportional to the number of quarters of contribution to
the system (truncated to Nmaxquarters), and to a reference wage, which, un-
til 1993, has been the average wage of the D best years of the pensioners’
career (past nominal wages being reevaluated at time of liquidation ac-
cording to a set of retrospective coeﬃcients). The equation giving the ini-
tial pension level is therefore:
(1) Pension      
  (average wage of the D best years),
the proportionality coeﬃcient  being itself modulated. It is maximal when
the pensioner leaves at age 60, with a number of quarters of contributions
of at least N  to all pension schemes: in that case, its value is set at 50 per-
cent, and this ensures a replacement rate of the reference wage (not neces-
sarily the last wage) equal to 50 percent. The same value of   also applies
whatever the number of contributed years when the individual leaves at age
65. In all other cases, the coeﬃcient is reduced (table 4.1).
1. Either by 1.25 percentage points for each missing quarter to reach the
value of N  quarters.
2. Either by 1.25 percentage points for each missing quarter to reach
age 65.
The adjustment actually applied is the one that leads to the most favorable
outcome for the pensioner (see table 4.1).
N of quarters, truncated to Nmax     
Nmax
158 Emmanuelle Walraet and Ronan MahieuFor cohorts born before 1934, N    Nmax   150.
Access to the full rate is also possible before 65 for people totalizing less
than 150 quarters if they are considered disabled or suﬀer from handicap.
Values of N  and Dare currently changing, while Nmaxremains set to 150.
As mentioned in the introduction, the value of N  should reach 160 quar-
ters when the 1993 reform fully produces its eﬀects (cohorts born after
1943). The same reform also scheduled a progressive increase of D, up to
twenty-ﬁve years (to be reached for cohorts born after 1948). But for the
cohorts we are going to consider here, the rules are those that prevailed be-
tween 1983 (when the possibility of retiring at age 60 was generalized) and
1993, that is, N    150 (37.5 years) and D   ten years.
This system means that the number of years of contribution aﬀects the
pension level in two ways, which may imply, in some cases, a very strong de-
pendency between the age at retirement and the level of the pension. To
provide a full understanding of this interaction, table 4.2 shows the conse-
quences of this system, with pre-1993 parameters for three reference cases
with individuals arriving at age 60 with, respectively, twenty-ﬁve, thirty,
and thirty-ﬁve years of contribution.
• The ﬁrst individual had to wait until age 65 to get retirement at a full
rate   (50 percent). Even then, however, his or her pension was re-
duced by the fact that he or she only totalized 120 quarters of contri-
bution at this age. The replacement ratio was therefore only equal to
120/150 of the maximum replacement ratio, which is equal to 50 per-
cent. Note that, at each age lower than 60, the downward adjustment
of   is here computed on the basis of the number of years missing to
reach age 65 rather than the number of quarters missing to reach a
value of Nequal to 150, since the rule consists of applying the most ad-
vantageous of the two adjustments.
• The second individual also had to wait until age 65 to get the full rate
 , but beneﬁted at this age of a higher replacement rate, equal to 140/
150 of the maximum replacement ratio of 50 percent. In this case, the
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Table 4.1 Value of   depending on age at receipt of ﬁrst beneﬁt and N, number of
quarters of contribution to the general regime (%)
Age
N 60 61 62 63 64 65
32.5 25 30 35 40 45 50
33.5 30 30 35 40 45 50
34.5 35 35 35 40 45 50
35.5 40 40 40 40 45 50
36.5 45 45 45 45 45 50

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0downward adjustment before age 65 is again based on the number of
years missing to reach age 65.
• The third person will not have to wait until age 65. He or she will ben-
eﬁt from the maximum replacement rate as soon as he or she reaches
a cumulated number of years of contributions equal to 150, that is, at
age 62.5. If he or she decides to leave between age 60 and 62.5, the
downward adjustment will now be computed according to the number
of years missing to reach the total of 150 contributed years, rather
than the number of years missing to reach age 65, since the ﬁrst rule is
now the most generous. Note also that, for this person, working past
the age of 62.5 does not bring any further advantage in terms of the ba-
sic pension level.
Some additional observations must be added to this presentation of the
general scheme:
• Some people were successively aﬃliated with diﬀerent schemes, espe-
cially in older generations: for instance, people transiting from agri-
culture or self-employment to the status of wage earner in industry or
in services. These people will cumulate two basic pensions, one from
their initial scheme and one from the general scheme. The latter one
will be proportional to the number of years spent in this scheme, ac-
cording to equation (1), yet coeﬃcient   will be evaluated taking into
account the total number of years contributed, whatever the scheme.
Reductions of  , furthermore, do not apply in a certain number of
cases: veterans, disabled workers, female workers with 24 contributed
years, and having raised three children.
• Equation (1) also implies that pensions, at the time they are claimed,
are computed in current French francs. They are then reevaluated
each year on a discretionary basis. During the 1970s and early 1980s,
the general policy was to overindex these pensions (with respect to the
average gross wage) in order to make up for the initial gap between
standards of living of workers and pensioners. Since the mid-1980s,
the practice has rather consisted of an indexation on prices. This prac-
tice has been conﬁrmed by the 1993 reform.
• When the average wage (D best years) falls below a ﬂoor, it is raised
to the level of that ﬂoor (about €12,000 in 2000) for individuals who
can claim a full-rate pension. These provisions (the minimum con-
tributif) mainly concern women who had part-time jobs or whose ca-
reers were short and whose annual earnings are thus very low. They
involve an additional strong incentive to postpone retirement until
the full rate.
• For women, Nmax and N  max are increased by two years for each child
they raised. Moreover, people (either men or women) who raised at
least three children enjoy a 10 percent increase in their basic pension.
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These schemes are almost fully contributory and are organized in a de-
ﬁned-contribution way (although they are not funded). Workers accumu-
late points during their careers, which are the pension’s basic unit of calcu-
lation:
1. Points are accumulated during workers’ careers in proportion to their
contributions: the contribution rate is ﬁxed, and 1 franc contributed in
year t is considered equivalent to the formal buying of 1/PPt points, where
PPt is the purchase price of one point (the oﬃcial term for this purchase
price is salaire de référence).
2. The pension is then equal to the total number of points accumulated
over the pensioner’s career, multiplied by a coeﬃcient V (valeur du point),
which is ﬁxed every year.
The pension level at time t can therefore be written for a pensioner who
started working at time t0 and stopped at time t1 as:




where   (t ) and w(t ) are, respectively, the contribution rate and the
worker’s wage at time t . As explained previously, only a fraction of the
wage is taken into account for computing contributions and points accu-
mulated each year:
1. For executives, contributions are collected by ARRCO for the part of
the wage below the ceiling, and by AGIRC for the segment of the wage that
is comprised between one and four ceilings.
2. For nonexecutives, the wage is truncated to three times the social se-
curity ceiling, and contributions are collected by ARRCO.
Concerning retirement age in these complementary schemes—normal
retirement theoretically remains at age 65, even after the 1983 reform,
which introduced retirement at age 60 in the general scheme.For retirement
below 65, a quasi-actuarial adjustment is supposed to be applied. But,
since the 1983 reform, this adjustment is not applied to people who fulﬁll
the conditions for a basic retirement at full rate (more than 37.5 years of
contribution).
4.2.3 Civil Servants
Civil servants have a unique pension scheme, directly ﬁnanced from the
state budget. As a general rule, pension claiming is possible at age 60, if
people have at least ﬁfteen years of service. A rather large minority can,
however, leave at age 55: primary school teachers, policemen, and prison
oﬃcers. For women who have raised at least three children, the age condi-
tion is completely relaxed. The beneﬁt formula is:
 (t )w(t )
  
PP(t )
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  (last gross wage, excluding bonuses)
The pension is a proportion of the last gross wage. Note that this gross
wage excludes bonuses, which represent, on average, 15 percent of the to-
tal net income (and up to 50 percent for some speciﬁc categories). These
bonuses remain insigniﬁcant for most civil servants working for the Edu-
cation Department, which is the largest employer, but can reach 50 percent
of the total net income for some speciﬁc categories, those with the highest
incomes.
The key variable is the number of years a civil servant worked. Each year
entitles him or her to a 2 percent annuity (table 4.2), the sum being trun-
cated to 75 percent. Once this basic annuity is computed, some other peri-
ods may be taken into account: the most important provision is the addi-
tional year given to women for each child they raised. Each additional year
also yields an additional 2 percent annuity, which may increase the basic
annuity up to 80 percent. Finally, people (men or women) who raised at
least three children enjoy a substantial increase in their pension. This in-
crease is 10 percent if they have raised three children, and an extra 5 per-
cent for every additional child. These provisions are roughly the same as in
the private sector.
Note that this system strongly diﬀers from the general regime as regards
incentives to retire early: let us consider the example of people reaching the
legal minimum age of retirement with only 32.5 contributing years, who
decide to immediately claim their beneﬁts. The civil servant’s replacement
rate is 65 percent (instead of 75 percent for a complete career). The private-
sector wage earner’s replacement rate (basic pension only) is 21.7 percent
(instead of 50 percent for a complete career).
4.2.4 Survivor Beneﬁts
Civil servants’ as well as private-sector wage earners’ widowers or wid-
ows may enjoy survivor beneﬁts. The computation of these beneﬁts is
rather complex and we will give only their main features here, since our
data prevent us from precisely computing these beneﬁts (regarding the lack
of information on spouses, see the following).
In the late 80s and early 90s (when our cohorts eﬀectively retired), sur-
vivor beneﬁts were far more generous for women than men: a civil servant’s
widow could enjoy survivor beneﬁts (typically 50 percent of her husband’s
pension entitlements) whatever her age, whereas a civil servant’s widower
had to wait until 60. Moreover, beneﬁts were capped at a relatively low level
for widowers, which was not the case for widows. In the private sector,
women could enjoy spouse beneﬁts from age 55, whereas widowers had to
Number of quarters, truncated to Nmax     
Nmax
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removed from the private sector in the late 90s, but the situation has re-
mained unchanged for civil servants’ widows or widowers.
4.2.5 Other Regulations Concerning Age at Retirement: Mandatory
Retirement and Eligibility to Early Retirement Beneﬁts
It is only for civil servants or in special schemes that mandatory retire-
ment exists as such. The age for mandatory retirement is generally 65, with
some exceptions either below that age (i.e., the armed forces) or above (very
limited categories are allowed to work until age 68, such as academics).
In the private sector, a ﬁrm is not allowed to lay oﬀ a worker according
to any age criterion. Yet it is allowed to do so when this worker reaches the
conditions to get a full-rate SS pension. Given the employment context of
the 1990s—and the relatively large wage gap between elder and younger
workers—it is quite likely that ﬁrms will quasi-systematically make use of
this possibility. A consequence, which will be recalled later when interpret-
ing results, is that decisions to retire at the age when people get the full rate
may be interpreted as demand-side as well as supply-side decisions.
Supply- and demand-side aspects are also strongly intertwined for all
forms of early retirement. Early retirement developed in several steps in
France. We will only describe the rules enacted after the 1983 reform, that
is, after the generalization of possibilities to retire at age 60. There are two
main paths to early exit from the labor force.
• One is through unemployment insurance. People falling into unem-
ployment are entitled to a compensation for a limited period of time;
the level of unemployment beneﬁts, since 1992, is decreasing with the
duration of unemployment. But these rules do not apply to people los-
ing their jobs past a certain age (57 until mid-1993, now raised to 58),
who can beneﬁt from a full compensation until they are able to bene-
ﬁt from a normal SS pension at a full rate. This system is not oﬃcially
described as an early retirement system, and people cannot enter into
it completely freely: they can do so only if they have been explicitly laid
oﬀ by their employers. Yet this system is more or less equivalent to an
early retirement scheme.
• The second path for early exit is the Fonds National pour l’Emploi
(FNE [National Fund for Employment]). The level of early retirement
beneﬁts is roughly similar to the level of unemployment beneﬁts.
People beneﬁting from this system can leave the labor force at around
58, with beneﬁts maintained until they have access to a full-rate pen-
sion in the general regime. The diﬀerence from the former path is that
this system is under direct control of the state: access to the FNE only
concerns workers laid oﬀin the context of a social plan, negotiated be-
tween the ﬁrm and the state, with some compensations oﬀered by the
ﬁrm (for instance, a commitment to hire young workers).
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Participation of men aged 50 and over sharply decreased over the past
twenty years. The share of men employed at ages 55, 60, and 65 decreased
from 83.4 percent, 47.0 percent, and 14.7 percent in 1983 to 78.5 percent,
32.1 percent, and 4.9 percent in 1998. The ﬁgures are somewhat diﬀerent
for women—52.2 percent, 29.1 percent, and 9.4 percent in 1983, 57.9 per-
cent, 25.9 percent, and 5.9 percent in 1998—since cohort eﬀects (the long-
run increase of female labor supply) partly oﬀset the eﬀect of both eco-
nomic diﬃculties (with growing exits through unemployment or early
retirement) and the decrease to 60 of the minimum age to get SS beneﬁts.
Nonetheless, the regular decrease in male participation rates appears to
have slowed down since 1997, due to the economic recovery.
In 1998 (table 4.3) employment rates reached 75 percent for people aged
50 to 54, but sharply decreased thereafter: 53 percent for the 55 to 59 age
group, and only 12.4 percent (most of them being self-employed) for the 60
to 64 age group. Participation rates are close to zero after 65. Very few self-
employed retire before 60. However, exit rates are high from 55 onward for
wage earners.
About 8 percent of the population received public beneﬁts (mainly un-
employment beneﬁts) between 50 and 54 in 1998 (table 4.4). This ﬁgure
reaches 23.7 percent between 55 and 59, due to unemployment or early re-
tirement (in the private sector) or SS beneﬁts (for a sizeable minority of
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Table 4.3 Labor market participation by age group
Employed
Age Cohort Public sector Private sector Self-employed Not working
50–54 1944–48 22.6 33.4 18.8 25.2
55–59 1939–43 13.3 21.9 18.0 46.8
60–64 1934–38 2.5 3.5 6.4 87.6
65–69 1929–33 0.0 0.3 1.2 98.5
Source: Financial Assets Survey, Insee (1998).
Table 4.4 Part of the population receiving public beneﬁts by age group
Preretirement Unemployment
Age Cohort SS beneﬁts beneﬁts beneﬁts Total
50–54 1944–48 1.3 0.0 7.2 8.5
55–59 1939–43 9.4 6.0 8.3 23.7
60–64 1934–38 68.9 1.4 2.4 72.7
65–59 1929–33 86.2 0.0 0.0 86.2
Source: Financial Assets Survey, Insee (1998).civil servants). Between 60 and 64, 72.7 percent of the population receive
public beneﬁts (now mainly SS beneﬁts).
Research Background
Previous research on retirement behavior in France is relatively scarce,
partly because economists lacked appropriate data until the échantillon inter-
régime de retraités (EIR) was built. Moreover, individuals were so heavily
constrained by SS incentives that explaining actual behaviors did not require
a sophisticated approach (in econometric terms, for instance). In the ﬁrst
part of this project, Blanchet and Pelé (1999) showed that incentives to retire
at the full rate were very strong. Pelé and Ralle (1999), using a life cycle model
(based on an intertemporal budget constraint), demonstrated that retiring at
the full rate was consistent with a rational utility-maximizing behavior.
Of course, retirement cannot entirely be explained by SS incentives: an-
alyzing early retirement behaviors in France as a three-player game (the
ﬁrm, the employee, and the government) may be of great interest, but once
again, the lack of appropriate, ﬁrm data did not allow for a comprehensive
analysis of individual behavior concerning early retirement.
4.3 Data Description
4.3.1 The Dataset
Few systematic datasets exist in France concerning the economic situa-
tion of retired people. Income surveys only give instantaneous and imper-
fect pictures of transfer incomes beneﬁting to retirees: they do not allow
the reconstitution of past labor income, which would permit the evaluation
of what these transfers would have been if the pensioners had made other
choices concerning their age at retirement.
Some other speciﬁc surveys were also realized to analyze the transition be-
tween activity and retirement (e.g., a questionnaire on this topic was added
to the regular Labor Force Survey in 1996). These surveys are especially use-
ful for analyzing the variety of institutional paths from full-time activity to
retirement (Caussat and Roth [1997], Burricand and Roth [2000]) and pro-
vide some interesting information on standards of living before retirement.
But these surveys do not provide precise information on past wages and thus
do not allow us to compute ﬁnancial incentives to retirement.
In practice, the only large-scale survey that is available and that is suited
for the current study is a speciﬁc panel, the EIR. This permanent survey
(whose origin goes back to 19841) matches administrative data collected
from all pension schemes that exist in France. This strategy revealed itself
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1. The operation has been initially organized by the SESI, the statistical unit within the
ministry of social aﬀairs, in connection with the INSEE. Since 1998, the SESI has been ab-
sorbed in a new direction within the Ministry of Social Aﬀairs, the Direction de la Recherche,
des Etudes, de l’Evaluation et des Statistiques (DREES).to be the only way to overcome problems raised by the multiplicity of pen-
sion schemes in France. The other possibility—relying directly on pen-
sioners’ declarations—would have been necessarily partial and incomplete
(given the limited knowledge these pensioners may themselves have of
these various schemes).
The survey was organized as follows. For the ﬁrst run, in 1988, four co-
horts of pensioners were selected: those born in 1906, 1912, 1918, and
1922. A sample totaling 20,000 people belonging to these four cohorts was
drawn by the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études (INSEE).
Their national identiﬁcation numbers were transmitted by INSEE to all
existing pension schemes (more than 120 basic schemes and about 180
complementary schemes). All these pension schemes then had to search
for these individuals in their records. If they were present, the information
about their pension entitlements was then transmitted to the statistics,
studies and information systems department, ministry of Social Aﬀairs
and Solidarity (SESI), who then carried out the matching, for all indi-
viduals of the sample, of the information returned by all existing pension
schemes. Note that this matching, by the SESI, has been made according
to an identiﬁcation number that was diﬀerent from the national identiﬁca-
tion number, in order to preserve the anonymity of ﬁnal data.
The survey was renewed in 1993 and 1997. Each time, the same samples
were redrawn for the cohorts included in the previous studies (and enlarged
to compensate for mortality), and new cohorts added to the panel: cohort
1926 in 1993, cohorts 1930, 1932, 1934, 1936, 1938, 1940, and 1942 in 1997
(table 4.5). Since 1990, an additional matching has also been introduced,
with information from other administrative sources:
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Table 4.5 Descriptive statistics on the sample
Variable Mean value









Skilled blue-collar (private) 0.189
Unskilled blue-collar (private) 0.105
Category A (public) 0.119
Category B (public) 0.055
Category C (public) 0.037
Total tenure (years) 36.4
Note: Sample size   10,572 observations corresponding to 2,352 individual paths.1. The Annual Declarations of Social Data (DADS), made each year by
ﬁrms, which allow one to retrieve wages of people of the sample over the
years before retirement, if these people were wage earners in the private
sector or employed in state-owned companies.
2. The wage ﬁles from the State Service, for former civil servants.
3. Files from the National Professional Union for the Employment in
Industry and Trade (UNEDIC), the French system of unemployment in-
surance, for people in unemployment before retirement (allowing, there-
fore, for the incorporation of the form of early retirement oﬀered by the
UNEDIC and the French National Employment Fund (FNF), as previ-
ously discussed).
This matching, however, does not allow a full reconstitution of past ca-
reers for these pensioners. DADS, in particular, generally do not go back
further than 1985, with one additional missing year in 1990. This match-
ing, for this reason, has not been done for cohorts 1906, 1912, and 1918, for
whom it would have been irrelevant.
Given the structure of data available in the panel, our question has been
to explore how these data could be best used for the estimation of a model
of retirement behavior for France. The choices that have been made re-
sulted from two constraints.
1. The need to have people for whom the situation before retirement has
been observed over a signiﬁcant period, in order to be able to extrapolate
what their standard of living would have been in case they would have re-
tired later than they actually did.
2. The need, conversely, to limit ourselves to cohorts for whom entry
into retirement can be considered as fully completed. As detailed in the
next subsection, our method for reconstructing individual pension entitle-
ments under alternative retirement ages relies essentially on the pension
level obtained at the actualretirement age. Of course, one possibility would
have been, for people not yet retired, to evaluate entitlements on the basis
of past working records. But the length of our wage records was too short
for such a reconstitution, and for this population our ﬁles did not provide
any proxy at all for the key variable, which is the number of quarters of past
contribution.
The ﬁrst constraint clearly ruled out cohorts 1906 to 1922. We also con-
sidered that wage data were too short, on average, for cohort 1926 (only
two years of wages being observed for an individual of this cohort retiring
in 1986). The second constraint, at the opposite end, ruled out cohorts
1934 to 1942. Even if a signiﬁcant share of these cohorts was retired in
1997, we would have missed the fraction retiring at 65, which is precisely
the fraction that brings the variance necessary to identify models. We con-
sidered that the same problem existed for workers from the private sector
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hort 1930. For civil servants, however, we decided to use both cohorts 1930
and 1932, in order to increase somewhat the sample size, considering that
the selection bias on cohort 1932 was lower than for the private sector,
given an average age at retirement that is lower in the public than in the
private sector.
Concerning the key question of the deﬁnition of retirement, our data
provided us with two possible choices: either the age when people deﬁnitely
leave the labor market, or the age when people claim SS beneﬁts. But this
latter deﬁnition is not the most interesting from an economic point of view,
since a huge majority of people in the private sector claim SS beneﬁts as
soon as they reach the full rate. It is more interesting to analyze the impact
of SS provisions (and, if possible, early retirement or unemployment pro-
visions) on the decision to deﬁnitely leave the labor market. We therefore
decided to model the last year of recorded past employment using DADS
data. This, of course, implies a restriction to people who are in paid em-
ployment in 1985, which limits a bit further our sample.
4.3.2 Reconstructing Wages, Taxes, and Pension Levels
Our data yield net wages (gross wages minus SS contributions) for all
wage earners still employed at age 55. We assume that wages then increase,
like the Consumer Price Index (CPI), for people employed in the private
sector. For civil servants, we assume that wages increase from age 55, like
the so-called “civil service point” that has been roughly following the CPI
evolutions for more than ﬁfteen years.
We compute income taxes assuming that people in our sample have only
wage or pension income or are single (or, equivalently, married with their
spouse earning the same income) with no children. This assumption is, of
course, excessive, but we lack additional information on nonwage and non-
pension income. Concerning indirect taxes, the normal VAT rate in France
was 18.6 percent in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but some speciﬁc prod-
ucts were taxed at a 5.5 percent reduced rate. We compute an apparent
VAT factor based on national accounts. This factor is deﬁned as the share
of indirect taxes (VAT, taxes on tobacco and alcohol, etc.) in personal dis-
posable income. We thus assume an apparent VAT rate of 13.9 percent.
Social security payroll taxes do not really exist for civil servants, since
pensions are directly paid on the state budget. We therefore compute
pseudo-contributions for civil servants by assuming that the total SS pay-
roll tax rate is the same for civil servants as for people employed in the
private sector.
4.3.3 Other Data
Computing the actual value of future pension beneﬁts required some
additional information: information on people’s own mortality risk, and
Simulating Retirement Behavior: The Case of France 169information on the presence of a spouse and this spouse’s mortality risk,
assuming that individual evaluations of beneﬁts include the evaluation of
survival beneﬁts if the individual dies before his or her spouse.
Mortality rates for people in the sample that was used are diﬀerentiated
by sex and age but not by socioprofessional group, as in step 2. One point
must be noted here: since the sample is conditioned on surviving until age
64 or 66 (depending on the cohort), a selection bias may result if there is a
correlation between mortality and the retirement decision. If people with
bad health status and a higher mortality risk tend to more frequently an-
ticipate the claiming of their beneﬁts, there will be a tendency to overesti-
mate the actual age at retirement. However, judging from the mortality
rates, this phenomenon should have a limited impact, as 14 percent of men
and 5.4 percent of women die between 55 and 65.
The ﬁnal sample consists of 10,572 observations (table 4.5) correspon-
ding to 2,352 individuals still employed at 55 (who are thus observed, on
average, between four and ﬁve years before they retire). Seventy-ﬁve per-
cent of them are employed in the private sector (with a majority being
men). Note that the average tenure at 55 is pretty high (over thirty-six
years) and close to the tenure required to reach the full rate at 60: this re-
ﬂects the fact that most people from the sample are entitled to full SS ben-
eﬁts as soon as age 60.
Analyzing pathways to retirement is straightforward for civil servants
(they have no other choice than waiting until the minimum age to claim SS
beneﬁts, unless they choose to consume their savings). In the private sector
(table 4.6), about 60 percent of people still working at 55 do not receive
public beneﬁts other than SS beneﬁts. The remaining 40 percent are
roughly equally divided between people retiring through unemployment
and early retirement schemes.
Table 4.7 provides information on the level of the parameter  . A very
tiny minority of men (0.3 percent) claim SS beneﬁts are reduced rate,
whereas the ﬁgure grows to 4.4 percent for women. About 4 percent of men
and women are considered as disabled and are thus allowed to claim full-
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Table 4.6 Pathways to retirement in the sample
Retiree category
Private sector Civil servants
Pathway Men Women Total Total
Directly to SS 57.4 60.8 58.7 100.0
Preretirement then SS 20.7 18.4 19.8 0.0
Unemployment then SS 21.9 20.8 21.5 0.0
Source: EIR, 1930 cohort, people still working at 55.rate SS beneﬁts from 60 (even if their tenure is below 150 quarters) is 3.7
percent of men and 10.7 percent of women. The percentage that are unﬁt
to hold a job and thus beneﬁt from a full-rate pension from age 60. Others
(over 80 percent of the sample) reach the full rate in normal conditions. In
the public sector, there is no such incentive to postpone claiming SS bene-
ﬁts after the minimum age (mostly 60), since   is set to 0.75 whatever the
total tenure. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile noting that the retirement rate
for civil servants who reach age 60 with 150 quarters or more is 69 percent,
whereas it drops to 53 percent for those who reach age 60 with less than 150
quarters. Moreover, the mean wage of civil servants who keep on working
after 60 is €32,000 (instead of €23,400 for those who quit at 60). Others
(over 80 percent of the sample) reach the full rate in normal conditions. In
the public sector, there is no such incentive to postpone claiming SS bene-
ﬁts after the minimum age (mostly 60), since   is set to 0.75 whatever the
total tenure. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile noting that the retirement rate
for civil servants who reach age 60 with 150 quarters or more is 69 percent,
whereas it drops to 53 percent for those who reach age 60 with less than 150
quarters. Moreover, the mean wage of civil servants who keep on working
after 60 is €32,000 (instead of €23,400 for those who quit at 60). Remember
that highly paid civil servants have—on average—lower replacement
rates, since a large part of their wage consists in bonuses. At ﬁrst glance,
civil servants also seem sensitive to SS incentives (despite their weakness).
But these preliminary observations must be conﬁrmed by a deeper anal-
ysis.
4.3.4 Spouse Issues
This chapter diﬀers from our previous work since we take survivor ben-
eﬁts into account. An ideal solution would have been to calculate an
expected survivor beneﬁt for each married individual of the sample, con-
ditioned on the spouse characteristics (particularly his or her SS entitle-
ments). However, we do not have such information. A solution would be
to match married males with every married female of the sample or with a
typical inactive woman, to compute survivor beneﬁts for each of these
would-be couples and deduce an average survivor beneﬁt using appropriate
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Normal conditions 92.0 81.0
Unﬁt for a job 3.7 10.7
Disabled 4.0 3.9
Reduced rate 0.3 4.4weights. However, our data provide no relevant information on the way in-
dividual characteristics aﬀect the individual process (for example, do edu-
cated men marry educated women? Moreover, we have no information on
educational achievements). We thus eliminated this time-consuming solu-
tion and considered the survivor beneﬁt of an average would-be spouse.
Married women in our sample are arbitrarily matched with a would-be
man with average male SS beneﬁts. Married men are matched with a
would-be woman with average female SS beneﬁts (with weight 0.8) and
with zero SS beneﬁts (with weight 0.2). In these elderly cohorts, about 20
percent of women never worked and thus cannot enjoy SS beneﬁts when
they reach age 60. We assume an age diﬀerence of two years between the
spouses, which matches what is commonly observed in French data.
4.4 A Descriptive Analysis of Incentives to Retire
4.4.1 Deﬁnition of Incentive Variables
Two kinds of model will be applied to the analysis of labor force partic-
ipation rates of older workers. In a ﬁrst step, we introduce simple measures
of SS incentives to retire in probit models to describe the choice to retire at
age t for individuals still in the labor force at this age. For an individual
aged t, we ﬁrst compute social security wealth at age t. The value of this
SSW will depend on the age t  tat which this individual will decide to re-
tire. Bs(t ) is the probability of surviving up to age s for an individual aged
t, and if T, at last, is the maximal age at death, we write:
SSW t,t   ∑
T
s t 
 s t    Bs(t )
If, when he or she is 55, an individual is married and his or her spouse is
alive, we add to this value the social security wealth corresponding to the
spouse’s would-be survivor pension if the spouse outlives the studied indi-
vidual. In terms of social security wealth, the survivor pension is recorded
for the spouse who dies ﬁrst and is thus at the origin of this survivor bene-
ﬁt. If SBs(t ) is the expected level of survivor pension at age s if the indi-
vidual retires at age t ; if  spouse(s/55) is the probability that the spouse sur-
vives up to age s 2 (according to gender) conditioned on being alive at 55,
as we assume here an age diﬀerence of two years between the spouses. The
SSW of the studied individual is:
SSW t,t   ∑
T
s t 
 s t    Bs(t )  ∑
T
s t 
 s t 1         spouse   SBs(t )
From this value, we derive the pension accrual at age t, which is the al-
gebraic increase in SSW that results, at age t, from the postponement of re-
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The accrual will be our ﬁrst measure of SS incentives. The tax rate is di-
rectly derived from the accrual. It captures the fact that a negative accrual
involves an implicit tax on continued work: a part of the expected wage (if
the individual postpones retirement) is taxed through the decrease in the
SSW. The tax rate thus writes:
Tax ratet   
An alternative measure is also directly derived from the deﬁnition of
SSW. This variable is the peak index, which is the diﬀerence between the
maximum of the SSWs associated to all possible ages at retirement beyond
the current year, and SSW in case of an immediate retirement.
Peakt   Max
s t 1
[SSW t,s]   SSW t,t
It assumes a less myopic behavior by the individual, who considers not
only the potential gain in SSW resulting from delaying retirement by one
year, but also gains that may be derived from retiring in any subsequent
year. However, as with all measures derived from SSW, a limitation of this
index is that it does not take into account the comparison that the individ-
ual can make between pension beneﬁts and the level of his or her labor in-
come. It assumes that the retirement decision is only aﬀected by variations
of pension entitlements. This limitation will be corrected in the following
estimation by the introduction of wages as covariates in probit models, but
it is more satisfactory to introduce incentive measures that introduce this
comparison between beneﬁt and wage levels in a less ad hoc way.
This is the case if we start from a model that fully includes expected ﬂows
of utility derived either from labor or retirement income. The model used
will be the Stock and Wise (1990) option value model. Let us consider
again an individual still in the labor force at age t. If he or she expects to re-
tire at age r, he or she can expect a ﬂow of labor incomes of (Yt,  ...  Yr–1)
until retirement, and then a ﬂow of pension beneﬁts [Br(r), Br 1(r), . . . ,
Bs(r), . . .]. It is assumed that this individual derives an indirect utility Uw
from his or her labor income and an indirect utility Ur from pension bene-
ﬁts. Time discounting occurs at rate  . For an age at retirement equal to r,
the expected utility at age t is therefore:
V t(r)  ∑
r 1
s t





Uw(Ys)   Y s
 
Uw(Bs)   (kBs) .
Accrualt  
Etwt 1
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ing income ﬂows through private savings, an assumption that will essen-
tially be valid for low- or medium-income workers. Given this deﬁnition of
utility, we assume that the individual decides to retire if the resulting ex-
pected utility is higher than the maximum value of utilities expected for all
other possible choices r   t. If we write
Gr(r)   V t(r)   V t(t),
the individual chooses to remain in the labor force if Gt(r∗)   0, where
r∗   Arg Max
r t 1
V t(r).
Therefore, Gt(r∗)  0 is called the option value of postponing retirement
to express that, given the irreversibility of retirement, remaining in the
labor force oﬀers the option to leave the labor force at a later age under
better conditions. Stock and Wise (1990) performed a full maximum-
likelihood estimation of the model on American data, which yielded   
0.97,   1.25, and   0.6. Our own estimation of the model on French
data led us to adopt the following parameterization:   0.97,   1.6, and
  0.25. These values imply some risk aversion and a moderate preference
for leisure: in the context of a one-period model, a value of   equal to 1.6
means that an individual would demand a leisure income equal to 62.5 per-
cent of his or her labor income to accept retirement.
4.4.2 Including Incentives Linked to Unemployment 
and Early-Retirement Beneﬁts
We performed simulations of retirement decisions based on previous
estimations. The main issue raised by our estimation process is the possi-
bility oﬀered to a number of workers to leave the labor market before the
minimum age required to claim SS beneﬁts: these workers receive unem-
ployment or early retirement beneﬁts that may both be viewed as early re-
tirement beneﬁts. This would not be a critical issue if we controlled for the
eligibility to these programs. Unfortunately, this is not the case: this would
require ﬁrm data providing some information on who had the possibility
to get early retirement or unemployment beneﬁts and who decided to
retire.
We took account of these possible pathways in the following manner: as-
sume, as a ﬁrst step, that an individual is actually free to choose one of these
means of early exit from the labor force. We can therefore compute three
values for the SSW: the one computed earlier on the basis of normal pen-
sion entitlements only, the ones if we assume that the individual begins by
spending a few years in unemployment or in the early retirement scheme
174 Emmanuelle Walraet and Ronan Mahieuand then moves on to normal retirement once he or she is entitled to the so-
cial security full rate. For instance, for an individual aged 55, we compute
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for a transition through early retirement.
Beneﬁts Bs
une and Bs
pre are computed as a fraction of the last wage by di-
rect application of oﬃcial rules.
We then compute a weighted average of these three SSWs. Weights are a
function of the sector of activity and reﬂect take-up probabilities. We
tested other covariates, like gender or professional status (executives ver-
sus blue collar versus white collars), but their coeﬃcients are mostly in-
signiﬁcant if sector dummies are included. This strategy is consistent with
the results of previous studies that show that the sector of activity predicts
access to early retirement or unemployment schemes far better than job
skills or social group (Colin, Iéhlé, and Matieu 2000). As a general rule, the
probability of facing a period of unemployment or early retirement at the
end of one’s career is markedly higher (at least for cohorts born around
1930) in industry. In particular, it is the automobile industry that concen-
trates the highest risks: at 55, there was a 60 percent probability of enter-
ing into unemployment or early retirement for a wage earner in the auto-
mobile industry. The reason is that around 1985, some sectors (including
the automobile industry) beneﬁted from exceptions, allowing for a lower
age at entry in Allocation spéciale du Fonds national de l’emploí (ASFNE;
ﬁfty-ﬁve years instead of ﬁfty-six years, two months).
These weights are conditional ﬁnal probabilities: for a worker with a
given age (e.g., 57) in a given sector (e.g., industry) we use the observed
probability for this worker of this sector to retire through early retirement
provisions (either early retirement or unemployment beneﬁts) conditional
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to these programs typically changes with age. For the considered cohorts,
exit probabilities through early retirement or unemployment beneﬁts were
rather high at 55 or 56, and then sharply decreased for those who remained
in the labor market (there were types of window plans for workers aged 55
to 56 in the mid-80s in France). We ﬁnally compute incentives (Accrual,
PV, and OV) with this weighted SSW.
4.4.3 Spouse Issues
The incentive variables are computed here for individuals; they include,
nevertheless, survivor beneﬁts. A household SSW would be deﬁned as the
sum of the SSW of the two spouses. But as we have explained previously,
the only way to generate households is to simulate an average spouse. The
spouse characteristics (wages, retirement ages, etc.) depend only on gen-
der, and do not result from any matching criterion. As a consequence, for
all the individuals of a given gender, the spouse’s SSW is a constant. There-
fore, in our case, the household SSW would only diﬀer from the individual
SSW by a constant and would not add any information to incentive vari-
ables.
4.4.4 Descriptive Results and Econometric Analysis
Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.8yields the median values of each incentive distinguished by age.
The results given here are quite diﬀerent from those of the second step, but
several changes in our simulation method (especially the fact that we in-
clude survivor beneﬁts in the computation of incentives) may account for
these discrepancies.
The tax rate incentive variable is deﬁned as the opposite of the ratio be-
tween the accrual incentive and the expected wage if the worker postpones
retirement. It may be considered as a tax rate since, if it is positive, the SSW
decreases and part of the expected labor income is lost through social se-
curity mechanisms.
Average SSW levels in these tables may diﬀer substantially from those in
other country studies. Two main limitations in our data may explain these
large ﬁgures.
1. We excluded the self-employed from our analysis, which induces an
upward bias on SSW, since the self-employed in the aftermath of World
War II voluntarily chose less generous pension schemes to avoid paying
large social security contributions.
2. Concerning civil servants, our data exclude those employed by local
governments or hospitals. Civil servants working for hospitals or local
governments are, on average, less skilled and thus lower paid than those
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Age NB SSW Accrual Tax Peak Option
A. Men, private sector
55 1,182 240,585 –3,361 0.23 –1,929 32.22
56 914 233,193 –3,647 0.26 –1,143 29.72
57 755 229,450 –1,399 0.12 3,034 26.26
58 647 232,680 913 –0.05 4,948 20.15
59 547 232,423 3,633 –0.21 3,660 11.61
60 512 235,690 –9,783 0.64 –9,783 –0.11
61 169 227,101 –8,436 0.53 –8,436 0.81
62 109 244,038 –8,308 0.47 –8,308 1.48
63 74 222,876 –9,025 0.52 –9,025 0.71
64 56 203,996 –8,467 0.53 –8,467 0.55
65 41 183,713 –7,966 0.56 –7,966 0.11
B. Men, civil servants
55 188 352,388 5,390 –0.25 10,244 55.05
56 160 353,343 3,223 –0.15 8,624 45.41
57 134 352,614 5,182 –0.25 9,132 35.04
58 131 358,863 3,045 –0.15 3,543 23.48
59 129 354,606 450 –0.02 450 12.06
60 125 359,480 –18,792 0.84 –18,942 –1.01
61 48 376,017 –21,324 0.86 –21,323 –1.06
62 35 360,196 –20,457 0.79 –20,457 –0.85
63 24 379,089 –25,094 0.91 –25,094 –1.29
64 19 372,915 –22,437 0.84 –22,437 –1.09
65 13 385,788 –28,404 0.91 –28,404 –14.09
C. Women, private sector
55 742 137,989 –2,123 0.18 1,332 37.73
56 584 133,732 –1,829 0.15 3,285 34.26
57 505 130,543 –721 0.06 4,234 30.27
58 427 129,559 19 0.00 4,342 23.59
59 361 129,716 2,819 –0.33 3,356 15.40
60 337 134,022 –3,340 0.30 –3,340 4.01
61 136 103,908 –1,011 0.12 –623 8.78
62 115 103,403 –1,237 0.13 1,316 8.39
63 92 98,107 –747 0.09 3,101 6.90
64 77 102,401 3,833 –0.45 3,909 4.28
65 62 107,266 –3,619 0.39 –3,619 0.76
D. Women, civil servants
55 240 331,980 –379 0.03 –379 12.25
56 189 316,266 2,059 –0.14 4,532 41.29
57 159 291,850 3,987 –0.25 9,360 32.63
58 149 286,929 2,727 –0.17 6,283 22.25
59 140 282,897 4,047 –0.27 4,047 11.63
60 135 281,714 –12,133 0.74 –12,133 –0.54
61 43 310,768 –12,865 0.61 –12,865 –0.23
62 32 293,548 –12,520 0.66 –12,520 –0.34
63 18 270,546 –15,484 0.86 –15,484 –1.12
64 11 226,657 –13,239 0.80 –13,239 –0.84
65 6 223,162 –14,359 0.90 –14,359 –11.97directly employed by the central government. We thus overestimate the av-
erage civil servant’s pension.
Econometric Analysis
The econometric estimations are performed with two diﬀerent speciﬁ-
cations of age: method S1 is based on a linear speciﬁcation of the age vari-
able, whereas age dummies (from age 55 to 65) are used with method S3.
For each age speciﬁcation (S1 or S3) two estimations are performed: one
with the peak variable (PV) and another with the option variable (OV).
Coeﬃcients on incentives variables are signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level,
with the expected sign in all simulations (see table 4.9). The coeﬃcient is
larger with the S1 simulation, since incentives related to ages of ﬁrst eligi-
bility to (early) retirement programs are better captured by age dummies
than by the linear age variable or the incentive variables. The coeﬃcient on
SSW is not signiﬁcant in all estimations and never has the expected (posi-
tive) sign: this result may stem from a positive correlation between SS en-
titlements and employees’ productivity. Assume that a ﬁrm employs two
types of old-age workers: the ﬁrst group consists of highly paid, highly pro-
ductive employees, and the second of low-paid workers, whose productiv-
ity is declining. Since the ﬁrm cannot decrease wages, this second group is
overpaid—although paid less than the ﬁrst group. It is costly to ﬁre these
workers, so the ﬁrm will wait until they can beneﬁt from early retirement
or other retirement programs, and then ask them to leave. As a result, this
may create a negative correlation between the level of SSW and the likeli-
hood to retire.
Age dummies are strongly signiﬁcant. We may distinguish three groups
of ages, ordered by increasing coeﬃcients: the ﬁrst age group contains ages
57 to 59 and 61 to 64. At those ages, very few people decide to claim SS ben-
eﬁts (either they claim beneﬁts as early as possible—60 for the private sec-
tor, 55 for some civil servants—or they decide to wait until 65), and very
few people leave their job to get early retirement beneﬁts (for most, exits to
early-retirement programs occur at ages 55 or 56). The second group con-
tains ages 55 and 56: there are some exits to early retirement or even re-
tirement for a minority of civil servants. The third group contains ages 60
and 65, the age of ﬁrst eligibility to full-rate SS beneﬁts for the huge ma-
jority of people in our sample.
The coeﬃcient on the linear age variable is counterintuitive—since neg-
ative—with the OV speciﬁcation: this may stem from unobserved hetero-
geneity in the preference for leisure in our sample: consider two popula-
tions that diﬀer only in their preference for leisure. Those who have a high
preference for leisure quit early, say at 60. At 61, the OV measure of the re-
maining population is lower than the OV measure of the whole population
at 60 (there remain fewer years of potential continued work) but is under-
estimated (since the computation does not account for the endogenous se-
178 Emmanuelle Walraet and Ronan Mahieulection on the preference for leisure). Nonetheless, the observed retirement
rate will be lower at 61 than at 60, since the considered population has a low
preference for leisure. If the econometrician does not observe the prefer-
ence for leisure, the coeﬃcients of linear age variables will be signiﬁcantly
negative.
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Table 4.9 Probit model of retirement
Peak S1 Peak S3 Option S1 Option S3
Men
SSW –0.012 –0.005 –0.018 –0.013
0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003
PV/OV –0.267 –0.094 –0.053 –0.035
0.020 0.020 0.003 0.003
Wage 0.074 0.020 0.277 0.174
Wage square 0.0025 0.0009 –0.0015 –0.0009














SSW –0.002 0.006 –0.019 –0.011
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007
PV/OV –0.319 –0.195 –0.039 –0.028
0.027 0.026 0.003 0.003
Wage 0.008 –0.169 0.380 0.175
Wage square 0.0053 0.0186 –0.0238 –0.0092












65 2.094 1.2014.5 Methodology of the Simulation of Reforms
In order to assess the ﬁnancial implications of the retirement incentives
and also to proceed to cross-country comparisons, four reforms are simu-
lated.
• Three-Year Reform: the minimum age to claim SS beneﬁts is shifted to
63. The full rate is obtained if people have worked at least 162 quarters
(instead of 150) or if they are 68. Access probabilities to unemploy-
ment or early retirement schemes are shifted by three years (access to
these schemes is therefore impossible before 58).
• Common Reform: people may claim SS beneﬁts from 60 (ERA).
Claiming SS beneﬁts at 65 (NRA) provides a 60 percent replacement
rate. The pension is decreased (respectively, increased) by 6 percent
per year below (respectively above 65). Access to early retirement or
unemployment schemes is now impossible. The complementary
schemes are also removed.
• Actuarial Reform: full-rate SS beneﬁts may still be claimed from 652
or from 60 for persons who have worked at least 150 quarters, as with
the current legislation. The early retirement age (ERA) is maintained
identical to the current one, that is, at 60. But penalties associated with
anticipated retirement are decreased to 6 percent for each year miss-
ing to reach 65 or 150 validated quarters (instead of 12 percent),
whereas SS beneﬁts are increased by 6 percent for each year worked
beyond the full rate and after age 60. With our assumptions, the NRA
is deﬁned individually as the age when a person reaches the full rate
(150 quarters or the age of 65). It thus depends on the number of quar-
ters validated. The level of early beneﬁts is also reduced for persons
who start receiving these beneﬁts before the age of 60: the reduction is
6 percent if they leave their job at 59, 12 percent at 58, and so forth.
• Charpin Reform: we assess the impact of the reform proposed in the
Charpin report in 1999. It consists ﬁrst in increasing the total number
of quarters of contributions required to claim full-rate SS beneﬁts to
170 quarters. Second, this reform would involve a decrease in penal-
ties associated with anticipated retirement for workers in the private
sector: in the beneﬁt formula for the general regime, the coeﬃcient  
is reduced by 0.6 percentage point missing to reach either 170 quarters
or age 65. For civil servants, the reform would simultaneously involve
an increase from 150 to 170 in the number of quarters required to
claim full-rate SS beneﬁts at age of ﬁrst eligibility to SS beneﬁts (55 to
60). Penalties associated with anticipated retirement (currently close
to zero) would increase: the coeﬃcient   (currently 75 percent for
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2. Or from 60, for the civil servants who were entitled to their pension from the age of 55.everybody) is reduced by 0.9 percentage point missing to reach either
170 quarters or age 65 (respectively, 60) for people whose age of ﬁrst
eligibility to SS beneﬁts is 60 (respectively, 55).
In essence, the Actuarial Reform is a halfway point between the current
system and the full Common Reform: the Common Reform is based on a
6 percent actuarial adjustment and a replacement rate of 60 percent at the
normal retirement age (NRA), whereas the NRA replacement rate in the
Actuarial Reform is the same as with the current system (i.e., larger than
60 percent). A speciﬁc diﬃculty for France (in comparison with other
countries) stems from the fact that the NRA is individual speciﬁc. For
most people (those who have worked at least 150 quarters) the NRA is 60:
the NRA is then identical to the ERA. But for a minority with short ca-
reers the NRA will be larger (up to 65) and diﬀerent from the ERA.
We simulate changes in retirement behavior following these reforms and
assess their ﬁnancial impact. This assessment deals with the whole govern-
ment ﬁscal impact, not just Social Security. Indeed, the taxes taken into ac-
count include payroll taxes, income taxes, and consumption taxes (VAT).
We distinguish the mechanical impact of reforms from their behavioral im-
pact: the mechanical impact is the expected change for public net expendi-
ture if we assume that no one changes his or her retirement behavior. The
behavioral impact is the diﬀerence between the total ﬁnancial impact (sim-
ulated with the estimates of the previous section) and the mechanical im-
pact.
Concerning the implementation of the Common Reform, the 60 percent
replacement rate is applied to an average wage computed over the whole ca-
reer. This average wage replicates the forty best yearly wages of a worker, in-
cluding zeros when the worker worked less than forty years. As wages before
55 are not available in our data, we simulate a trend for real wages along a
career, taking into account a ﬁxed return per year of seniority, consistent
with the magnitude of previous estimates on French data (Lolliver and
Payen 1990). We apply this trend to the last known wages, including the
eﬀect of the tenure, to get an average of yearly wages for the best forty years.
These real lifetime earnings are deﬂated using the average net wage index.
For these four reforms, we compute the incentives for individuals aged
55 to 66, taking into account possible retirement up to age 68. Since retire-
ment after 66 remains minor, all workers leaving after 66 are gathered with
workers leaving at 66.
A key issue in our simulations is how to deal with age dummies in spec-
iﬁcations of type S3. Estimated age dummies are likely to capture age of
ﬁrst eligibility eﬀects—eligibility to either early retirement or retirement
beneﬁts. Thus, these eﬀects are a serious matter of concern.
• In the Three-Year Reform, the eligibility to all programs is raised by
three years.
Simulating Retirement Behavior: The Case of France 181• In the Actuarial Reform—as well as in the Charpin Reform—ages of
eligibility to diﬀerent programs remain unchanged: we thus keep the
same coeﬃcient levels.
• In the Common Reform, people are no longer eligible for early retire-
ment programs.
Our ﬁrst concern was to determine as precisely as possible the appropri-
ate level of coeﬃcients on age dummies when people are not eligible to any
(early) retirement program: a no-eligibility coeﬃcient. We chose the mean
of estimated coeﬃcients on age dummies at 58 and 59: in our sample, most
exits to early retirement in the private sector occurred at ages 55 and 56,
and very few at ages 58 and 59. Moreover, the age of ﬁrst eligibility to SS
beneﬁts is 60 for most people (except 55 for a minority of civil servants [but
those who are eligible to SS beneﬁts at 55 usually either quit at 55 or 56, or
postpone retirement until they reach age 60]).
In the Three-Year Reform, we multiply the age 58 dummy by the esti-
mated age 55 coeﬃcient (here zero, since age 55 was the reference), the age
59 dummy by the estimated age 56 coeﬃcient, and so on. For ages 55 to 57,
since there is no open early retirement program, we multiply the age dum-
mies by the no-eligibility coeﬃcient.
In the Common Reform, we keep the estimated coeﬃcients for ages 60
and 65, since 60 or 65 were already ages of eligibility to normal SS beneﬁts
for all workers in the sample. For ages 55 to 59, since there is no open re-
tirement program, we multiply the age dummies by the no-eligibility co-
eﬃcient. For ages 61 to 64, we also use the no-eligibility coeﬃcient, as it re-
ﬂects retirement behavior between the early retirement age (55) and the
normal retirement age (60 to 65). Eventually, for age 66, we use the average
of the estimated coeﬃcients between age 61 and 64, as they stand for re-
tirement after the ﬁrst normal retirement age.
Expected Eﬀects
The Three-Year Reform should induce a rather large increase in the re-
tirement age, since eligibility to allretirement pathways (including early re-
tirement) is postponed by three years. Since the level of annual pensions
does not fundamentally change (the average pension should slightly in-
crease, since workers have longer careers), total SS entitlements should de-
crease by a large amount.
The Actuarial Reform should have a positive eﬀect on the average level
of SSW. Its impact on the mean age of retirement is not straightforward:
the decrease of penalties should include earlier retirement. But increasing
pensions when people claim SS beneﬁts with more than 150 quarters has a
priori mixed eﬀects: on the one side, it induces people to postpone their re-
tirement through a price eﬀect; on the other side, it increases the level of
people who already leave with more than 150 quarters, and could induce
them to anticipate retirement through a wealth eﬀect.
182 Emmanuelle Walraet and Ronan MahieuIn France, for the cohorts considered, the Common Reform involves a
sharp decrease in replacement rates: for a normal career, replacement rates
(including complementary schemes for the private sector) were close to 75
percent of the last wage. With the Common Reform, the pension would
amount to 60 percent of the real lifetime earnings, as previously deﬁned,
which are likely to be smaller than the last wages. Associated with the elim-
ination of early retirement programs (before age 60), this may create an in-
centive to postpone retirement. However, most of the eﬀect of the reform
on total SS entitlements should be more mechanical than behavioral, since
the Common Reform dramatically lowers the level of the average pension.
The Charpin Reform should have far smaller eﬀects on retirement be-
havior and aggregate SS entitlements than the Three-Year Reform or the
Common Reform: the tenure required to claim full-rate SS beneﬁts at age
60 increases by ﬁve years, but ages of eligibility to retirement programs re-
main unchanged.
4.6 Results of the Simulations
Tables 4.10 and 4.11, ﬁgures 4.1, 4.2, 4.4, and 4.6 yield average SSWs or
PDVs of beneﬁts per worker, in euros. Table 4.12 yields total PDV for each
quintile in euros. Figure 4.7 yields variations in the total PDV of beneﬁts
(with a distinction between mechanical and behavioral eﬀects) in percent-
age of GDP: we multiplied average amounts per worker (in euros) by the
number of retired people we consider here, and then divided by GDP. Our
number of retired people excludes people who stopped working before age
55, given our sample restrictions: our ﬁgures thus underestimate the total
eﬀect of reforms, since these people get reduced (respectively, increased)
beneﬁts if the simulated reform consists in a reduction (respectively, an in-
crease) in SS beneﬁts.
4.6.1 PDV of Gross Beneﬁts by Age of Retirement
Figure 4.1 presents the present discounted value (PDV) of the gross so-
cial security wealth (SSW) by age of retirement. With the current rules, the
values are decreasing with the age of retirement because, when retirement
is delayed by one year, the loss of one year of pension is not compensated
by a much higher level of pension. The decreasing slope is stronger after
60, as the pension level is far more important than the average replacement
income in case of a retirement before 60.
The Three-Year Reform shifts this proﬁle to the right, with a loss in the
level of SSW before 63. This loss is much higher between 55 and 57 due to
the suppression of the early retirement and unemployment schemes. But,
after 63, the diﬀerence in the SSW with the current rules and with the three-
year shift almost vanishes.
With the Common Reform, the PDV of the gross SSW does not depend
on the age of retirement (given the quasi-perfect actuarial adjustment) and






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0the level of SSW is very low compared to the current rules, due to the dra-
matic decrease in the average replacement rate.
The Actuarial Reform provides higher levels of SSW than the current sit-
uation, whatever the age of retirement. The results exhibit a more regular
decrease with age than in the base case. However, this case is a halfway
point between the current situation (with a strong deviation from actuar-
ial fairness) and pure actuarial provisions. The age proﬁle of SSW is thus
not ﬂat (contrary to the Common Reform).
The Charpin Reform induces a small loss in SSW for all ages of retire-
ment. Because the new rules disadvantage early retirement, and also be-
cause of the discounting hypothesis, this loss decreases with the age of re-
tirement.
4.6.2 PDV of Taxes by Age of Retirement
Figure 4.2 shows the PDV of the taxes paid by age of retirement. Con-
sistent with our intuition, the PDV of taxes increases with the age of re-
tirement with the current rules. Indeed, working one more year implies
paying taxes on one more year of labor income and also earning a better SS
pension, which will result in higher taxes for each year of retirement.
For the Three-Year Reform, the strong loss in SSW for retirement before
63 appears through a smaller level of PDV of taxes paid for those ages.
In like manner, for the Actuarial Reform, the better SSW for all ages of
retirement appears through a higher level of PDV of taxes paid than with
the current rules, particularly for later retirements.
With the Common Reform, the taxes paid remain lower than with the
current rules. However, the evolution of the PDV of taxes with the age of
retirement is much quicker than with the current rules. Indeed, the gap be-
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Fig. 4.1 Peak value of social security beneﬁts by age of retirementtween taxes paid with the current rules and with the Common Reform is
due to the smaller level of pension with the Common Reform. The part of
the taxes on pensions in the total of the taxes paid decreases with the age
of retirement. As a result, the gap between the PDV of taxes paid with the
current rule sand with the Common Reform decreases with the age of re-
tirement.
The Charpin Reform generates slightly smaller levels of PDV of taxes, in
particular for early retirement.
4.6.3 Age of Retirement
The results from the OV-S1 method display an average retirement post-
ponement greater than three years, which is doubtful. This may stem from
the negative sign for the coeﬃcient on the linear age variable, which con-
tradicts the expected increase of the utility of leisure with age (section 4.4).
We shall not comment in detail on the results induced by this method (ﬁg-
ures 4.3 and 4.4), but shall concentrate on the OV-S3 results.
Figure 4.5 shows the distributions of the ages at retirement with the OV-
S3 modeling. The distributions of the ages at retirement evidence a strong
delay in retirement ages with the Three-Year Reform, with an average in-
crease of 2.4 years with the OV-S3 method. The retirement ages proﬁle is
close to what is expected, with new retirements before 58 and two peaks at
58 and 63.
Introducing more actuarial fairness hardly changes the distribution of
the ages of labor force exit. We observe a slight decrease in the average age
at retirement: the decrease in penalties associated with retirement before
reaching the full rate are decreased and some people decide to quit earlier.
For the Common Reform, the average delay in the age at retirement is
even higher than the one observed with the Three-Year Reform (3.6 years).
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Fig. 4.2 Peak value of taxes by age of retirementFig. 4.3 Labor participation eﬀects of reforms—Distribution of the age at retire-
ment, OV-S1 method
Fig. 4.4 Distribution of total eﬀect, OV-S1 method: Total Eﬀect by Age of Retire-
ment (OV S1 Model); A, Age-Shift Reform; B, Actuarial Reform; C, Common Re-
form; D, Charpin Reform
A B
C DThe ages proﬁles show almost no retirement before 60, a large peak at 60,
and a smaller one at 65.
For the Charpin Reform, the average delay is smaller (0.3 years). Retire-
ment rates slightly decline before age 60 because fewer people reach the
new target of 170 quarters of contributions.
4.6.4 Fiscal Eﬀects: Mechanical versus Behavioral
Figures 4.6 and 4.7show the impact of the diﬀerent reforms on the gross
and net present discounted value of Social Security beneﬁts and present a
decomposition of the total net eﬀect between mechanical and behavioral
components.
The Three-Year Reform induces a signiﬁcant decrease (between 0.5 per-
cent and 0.8 percent of GDP) in the net present discounted value (NPDV)
of SS beneﬁts (see ﬁgure 4.7). More than 50 percent of this decrease (i.e., 0.4
percent of GDP) results from simulated behavioral eﬀects according to the
OV method. Behavioral eﬀects are smaller if we focus on PV simulations,
but OV simulations take the future ﬂows of wage income into account bet-
ter than PV simulations. The future ﬂows of income here are important,
since continuing to retire at 60 now means no income until age 63 for people
who do not qualify for early retirement beneﬁts. The decrease in the NPDV
of SS beneﬁts is especially signiﬁcant at ages 55 to 57 (see ﬁgure 4.6), since
the age of ﬁrst eligibility to early retirement beneﬁts is now 58 and at age 60,
since the age of ﬁrst eligibility to normal SS beneﬁts is now 63.
The Actuarial Reform induces a smaller increase in the NPDV (about
0.3 percent of GDP) and behavioral eﬀects range from 0.1 percent to 0.2
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Fig. 4.5 Labor participation eﬀects of reforms—Distribution of the age at retire-
ment, OV-S3 methodpercent of GDP. The increase is the largest at ages 55 and 56, since people
who decide to leave at those ages without reaching the full rate face re-
duced penalties when they claim SS beneﬁts.
The Common Reform exhibits a large decrease in the NPDV of SS ben-
eﬁts: about 1.7 percent of GDP. We prefer, again, OV speciﬁcations, since
PV simulations (where the behavioral eﬀect is negligible) do not capture
the sharp decrease at all in the replacement rate of wage income by SS ben-
eﬁts at each age. The mechanical eﬀect is very large: about 1.3 percent of
GDP, and the behavioral eﬀect is estimated to be 0.4 percent of GDP.
The Charpin Reform shows a small decrease in the NPDV of SS beneﬁts
(about 0.2 percent of GDP), less than half of which results from behavioral
eﬀects. This decrease is sharp at ages 55 to 57: people who qualiﬁed for
early retirement beneﬁts at these ages, and thus retired before 60, could
claim full-rate SS beneﬁts at 60 with the full rate since they had worked 150
quarters or more. This is no more the case for a large part of them because,
in the reform, full-rate SS beneﬁts at 60 are only available for those who
worked 170 quarters or more.
4.6.5 Distributional Issues
Let us now consider distributional issues (see tables 4.12 and 4.13). The
age-shift reform has a negative impact for all quintiles, since the age of ﬁrst
eligibility to SS beneﬁts increases by three years for all people. But this
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Fig. 4.6 Distribution of total eﬀect by age of retirement, OV-S3 method: A, Age-
Shift Reform; B, Actuarial Reform; C, Common Reform; D, Charpin Reform
A B
C Deﬀect is larger for the highest quintile: this does not stem from the eﬀect of
the reform on the gross PDV of SS beneﬁts (the evolution is more or less
the same for all quintiles) but on taxes, especially income taxes. Since
people retire later and the level of pensions is clearly below the level of
wages, people pay higher income taxes. This eﬀect is large on the highest
quintile but small for other quintiles (a large majority of people in the
third-lowest quintiles pay zero income tax in France).
The Actuarial Reform has a positive impact for all quintiles, but the
eﬀect is larger for the extreme quintiles: in the lowest quintile, people often
faced liquidity constraints that led a signiﬁcant number of them to claim
reduced beneﬁts at 60, although it would have been better for them to wait
until 65, given the strength of penalties. These people take advantage of the
decrease of penalties. In the highest quintile, a number of people already
worked after 60, although they did not expect any increase in SS beneﬁts
(perhaps because their replacement rate was rather low). They take advan-
tage of the possibility to get higher SS beneﬁts for people who postpone re-
tirement after the full rate.
The Common Reform has a negative impact for all quintiles, given the
sharp decrease in replacement rates, but the eﬀect is larger for low quin-
tiles: the replacement rate in the base case decreases with wage income and
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Fig. 4.7 Fiscal implications of reforms (percent of GDP): A, 3-year increase in


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8is 60 percent for all (whatever the level of wage income) in the Common Re-
form. The loss is thus larger for low-paid people.
With the Charpin Reform the eﬀects are rather small, and nothing ap-
pears clear concerning distributional issues.
4.7 Conclusion
This analysis focuses on the steady-state impact of reforms of retirement
rules on an age-55 cohort. We rely on a previous assessment of the sensi-
tivity of individual retirement behavior to the structure of Social Security
incentives (Mahieu and Blanchet 2002). This enables us to measure the ﬁs-
cal implications of changes in individual retirement decisions and thus to
decompose the ﬁnancial impacts of simulated reforms between this behav-
ioral component and a mechanical component. However, the analysis does
not incorporate any general equilibrium eﬀect that may occur.
We simulate several reforms so as to assess the impact of the behavioral
component on the total amount of Social Security beneﬁts paid. The re-
sults exhibit a large impact of behavioral responses to modiﬁcations in SS
provisions. For example, a reform that introduces a unique normal re-
placement rate of 60 percent at age 65 and a strictly actuarial adjustment
involves a sharp increase in the average retirement age. This behavioral
component is estimated to reduce the net present discounted value of SS
beneﬁts for the 1930 cohort by as much as 0.4 percent of GDP.
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